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Media in dictatorial regimes: Case study of North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Russia

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Abstract. This study is A qualitative method used for this study to explore the freedom of media in North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Russia, In today's world, the media plays a significant part in the conduct of contemporary warfare by tilting the balance of public opinion in favor of certain camps. In North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan, the purpose of this research is to determine the degree to which freedom of speech and the degree to which media freedoms impact the perceived significance of journalists about a variety of characteristics. And because freedoms of media and expression are non-existent in these countries, which are repressive states according to the order of indicators of many organizations, associations, and centers of studies concerned with human rights, in particular, this study analyses the degree of freedom of expression as well as the perceived credibility of journalists for their sources on their perceptions of the various features of North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan, even after control has been exercised. To investigate these concerns, he disclosed information on media freedoms in North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan. The findings indicate that the amount of impact exerted by various elements at various levels might change depending on the topics or parts of issues that are covered by journalists. In the cases of North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan, sources operating at the institutional level had a considerable influence on the perceived significance of the rogue state aspect of North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan among journalists. When compared, the nationality of journalists working at the social system level was a more accurate predictor of the perceived relevance of journalists to the conversation partner factor in North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan.

Keywords. Media, Dictatorial, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Russia, Media Freedom, Freedom of Speech

1.1 Introduction

It is known worldwide that the intra-elite power-sharing within the governing coalition influences the amount of media freedom in authoritarian regimes, even though every dictator has a strong motivation to control the media. (Sheen et al., 2022). The media has a significant impact on contemporary warfare because of its ability to sway public opinion. Consequently, the various components rely on the media to accomplish their objectives. Terrorism, demonstra-tions osten-sibly for peace, and assaults on both public and private infrastructure are all vital to these battles. Countries like North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Russia have almost no press freedom.

Studies on media evolution stress the media's potential to liberalize political systems via its watchdog role, while also noting that state-controlled media supports authoritarian rule through its role as a government mouthpiece. (Cho et al., 2017). However, in authoritarian countries, where governments can exert varying degrees of control over the media, there is no clear correlation between media exposure and political activity. Some authoritarian regimes invest substantial time, money, and manpower in silencing the media to mitigate the media's potentially disruptive impact.

A few years of freedom of speech were all that were allowed before the state, then led by Russia geopolitically, started to cut up any dialogue and embrace an isolationist policy. Thinking critically and being honest were discouraged. The government started leading public debates and eventually began regulating every facet of society's cultural production and political speech. Turkmen Islam, for instance, is an important part of Turkmen's national identity that should be embraced today. The five-year civil war in Tajikistan, the Russian fight in Chechnya, and the possibility of extremists crossing the common border with Afghanistan all contribute to the Turkmen government's concern about public unrest (Clement, 2020).

E.g., Turkmenistan does not have a media landscape. (Mackinnon, 2019). There are several state-run media outlets that all report the same official story. There have been instances when floods have engulfed whole cities in Turkmenistan and the media has failed in its duty to convey the news. Unfortunately, accidents do occur. Assaults and homicides are a problem here. People in positions of authority are often arrested and prosecuted for corruption, yet the media seldom covers these cases. Any issue of a Turkmen newspaper will tell you that the president's trip to a horse race or his interaction with dogs is the most fascinating news of the week.

After over a decade of crises, Turkmenistan and Russia's bilateral ties have been on the rise in recent years. In addition to a general improvement in ties, the recent thawing of tensions has allowed for important advances in areas like commerce and security cooperation. (Muhamedov, 2021). Despite the steady improvement of relations, there are still barriers to full integration, such as Turkmenistan's refusal to participate in projects centered on Russia. This is due to Ashgabat's determined effort to preserve its foreign policy strategy, which advocates maintaining an equal distance from the world's major powers.

According to Troianovski & Safronova, 2022, Russia confronts its worst economic crisis in decades as a consequence of this week's punishing Western sanctions, the Kremlin is cracking down to quell anger over the conflict and to control the narrative. Independent Russian media outlets continued to close down on Friday for fear of punishment, and the BBC said it would be pulling out of the country altogether. Facebook, a social network popular with the Westward-looking urban middle class, where many have expressed furious criticism of Mr. Putin's conflict, was also banned within Russia, along with the websites of major Russian-language journalists headquartered outside.

Recently, North Korea has been warming up to longtime ally Russia, to the point that Pyongyang has hinted at sending laborers to assist restore Russian-occupied regions in Ukraine. The United States claims that North Korea, one of the world's most militarized states, has been providing Soviet-era munitions, such as artillery rounds.

However, The competing desires Pyongyang has for its fixer-minders to both control and woo the correspondents and a news environment increasingly open to Western media have led to the further diversification of roles among these journalistic workers. While minders from the State Security Ministry surveil journalists without directly interacting with them, English-speaking locals who work as photographers or writers contribute by taking pictures and writing stories. Foreign correspondents gradually form a collegial rapport with the locals, which in turn

makes them suspect in the eyes of the North Korean state despite the impeccable ideological credentials that earned them the posts in the first place. (Seo, 2019).

1.2 Define Problem Statement

This study aims to reveal the extent of the level of media and press freedoms and freedom of expression in countries such as North Korea, Russia, and Turkmenistan. In theory, this research is expected to provide useful inputs for students who wish to conduct research, as well as study the media that may recently obtained a lot of study from various disciplines both through theoretical studies and especially in the field of communication studies. In practice, it can be an evaluation and reference material for managing the media industry in the country, especially in countries where media wealth is almost non-existent, such as Turkmenistan, North Korea, and Russia, in terms of media affinity and media ownership.

2. Literature Review

Central Asian newspapers and television are both a platform and a battleground for competing political and economic interests, activist ideals, and realistic realism. The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan use their national media outlets to communicate with their respective civil communities in a wide range of ways, from open conversation to overt restriction, and from subtle manipulation to extreme coercion. (Rollberg & Laruelle, 2015).

The lives of individuals in the area, like other developing nations, have been profoundly impacted by news and social media outside politics, especially among young people who are a blend of global and local perspectives. (Reyaz, 2020). Even while Western organizations often score Central Asian nations poorly on media freedom, this only captures a tiny portion of the media landscape in these countries. Such assessments give more weight to journalists' rights and legal restrictions imposed by authoritarian governments than they do to the perspectives of their readers or viewers. So, they can't fully portray the more nuanced functions that media play in Central Asian countries. Furthermore, these rankings come with some conceptual limitations, including the assumption that freer media automatically create new support for democratization, whereas freer media can also give rise to "illiberal" ideologies and, in some cases, such as Kyrgyzstan, to a more vocal nationalism. Articles in this special issue explore some unexpected facets of the Central Asian media landscape, such as how Kyrgyzstan's more open political competition led to lower trust in the media than neighboring Kazakhstan, or how web-based news, often promoted in the West as an alternative source of information, negatively impacted youth confidence in electoral processes.

The first wave of post-Soviet media regulations was built upon the precedent set by the USSR Law on the Press. Following its passage, the post-Soviet republics also banned censorship of the media and guaranteed a similar range of press freedoms. (Richter, 2007). The media monopoly was broken, and now any legal adult could start a news organization. As a result, journalists now have the freedom to do things like elect editors-in-chief and create editorial charters to guarantee editorial autonomy. There was "early hope" that a free press would aid the transition of the former Soviet countries to democracy following the Soviet Union's fall. (Freedman, 2011).

2.1 Media in Turkmenistan

According to Statista media freedom in Turkmenistan is among the world's most tightly controlled. The government controls the media by providing funding to almost all publications. There must be no criticism of the president. The state's policy of requiring licenses for all media

effectively muzzles those that do not share the government's official point of view. (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 Turkmenistan media freedom ranking.

Source: <https://blogs.prepladder.com/world-press-freedom-index-upsc-current-affairs/>

In 1995, Brown observed that Turkmenistan's media business had seen the least transformation since Soviet times, ranking it last among the Central Asian governments. (Brown, 1995). As of 2013, Turkmenistan was the least changed country in the world. There were 39 newspapers, 1 news agency, 7 TV channels, and 5 radio stations in operation as of the beginning of 2013. The nation has a population of over 5 million people. There is just one privately owned newspaper in the country, and that is Rysgal (Welfare). Rysgal, which was founded in 2010 by the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Turkmenistan, is under the direct authority of Turkmenistan's president, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov. There are six national channels: *Altyn Asyr* (Golden Age) for current events, *Yaslyk* (Youth) for entertainment, *Miraz* (Heritage) for education, *Turkmenistan* (available in seven languages) for international reporting, *Owazy* (available in music only), and *Turkmenistan Sport* (available in sports only) for sports coverage. *Ashkhabad* (Ashgabat) City Channel also broadcasts to the suburbs outside of the country's capital. The State Committee on Television, Radio Broadcasting, and Cinematography is responsible for all of Turkmenistan's television stations and has the legal authority to implement the country's digital television transition.

North Korea is the only country in the world to have better press freedom than Turkmenistan, according to the most recent World Press Freedom Index. Given the current status of the media in the nation, this is not shocking. The press in Ashgabat, first and foremost, exists only to serve the ruling class and the monarch personally. As parliament just honored President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov's granddaughter Kerimguly Berdimuhamedov with the *Türkmeni Altyn Asyry* music award, media outlets are competing to glorify President Berdimuhamedov and his family. The front page of every newspaper has a heavily manipulated image of Berdimuhamedov. *Milli Liderimiz* (Our National Leader), *Gahryman Arkadagymyz* (Our Heroic Protector), and *Hormatly Prezidentimiz* (Horribly President) are all expressions that follow the president's name (Our Dear President). Except for the weekly *Zaman Turkmenistan*, which is a private corporation, each of Turkmenistan's other 26 newspapers is a government-run enterprise. Fifteen of them were established by members of the cabinet, while the others have ties to labor organizations and state or local governments. There are three official news outlets in Turkmenistan. The State News Agency is responsible for two of them, while the State Publishing Service is in charge of the third. Despite this, the Ministry of National Security has an unofficial hand in regulating these independent platforms (MNS). The committee for the protection of state secrets in the mass media, which reports to the government, regulates newspapers and periodicals. Publication in any form of media is prohibited without the consent of this board. If the content is not approved, the State Publishing Service, the sole publishing firm authorized to produce periodicals, will not begin printing. Those familiar with the Turkmen state media say that the censoring committee makes decisions on everything from the size of images to the names of fruits. As a bonus, it can forbid the usage of certain terms, images, and even whole categories. Photographs of guys who have facial hair or who have tattoos are two examples of subjects the committee frowns upon. The committee's makeup is unknown. However, records from the finance ministry's website show that the state budget is used to pay for its operations. (Jomartov, 2020). However, the State Publishing Service is not included in the departments funded by the state's general fund. Following the *khozraschyot* model of self-financing system administration, it relies on mandatory subscription fees for its operating funds. Each state employee is required to have a newspaper and magazine subscription. As an example, educators get the *Mugallymlar Gazeti* (Teachers' Newspaper) while justice ministry employees receive the *Adalat* (Justice Ministry News) (Justice). A subscription to the Defense Ministry's publication is mandatory even for the armed forces.

Meanwhile, Berdimuhamedov is eager for his administration to become digital. Even in the realm of mass communication, this holds. In March 2020, President Xi Jinping gave Bahargul Abdiyeva, the deputy prime minister in charge of mass media and cultural affairs, orders to devise a plan to digitize newspapers and periodicals. This action seems reasonable at first glance. The effort to execute it was, of course, ridiculous. The State Publishing Service slashed print edition distribution by around 45 percent. In 2019, the Nesil daily had a readership of 57,925, but that number had dropped to 31,129 in only a year. As of the same month in 2019, Edebiyat we Sungat, a popular weekly newspaper, had published 69,638 copies; by November 2020, that number had dropped to 35,367. Since the State Publishing Service merely required that subscriptions be moved to its website, where all newspapers and magazines were hosted, the decline in revenue did not affect the company's bottom line. There are no publicly available subscription statistics. Despite the country's weak internet infrastructure, it's obvious that the shift has benefited the Publishing Service. This state-centric approach further isolated individuals who already lacked access to the media because of poor connection or because they did not have access to cellphones or laptops. The media also served its usual purpose elsewhere in the face of the epidemic. For the umpteenth time, Berdimuhamedov has said that not a single incident has been reported in his nation. Despite the World Health Organization's (WHO) recent acknowledgment that "as witnessed in other nations, there may be hidden outbreaks of disease," the country of Turkmenistan remains off-limits to WHO investigators.

2.2 Relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia

Russia and Turkmenistan have signed many bilateral accords since the fall of the Soviet Union that outline their areas of cultural cooperation. The Russian-Turkmen Treaties of 2002 (Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 2002) and 2017 (Treaty on Strategic Partnership, 2017) establish the significance of cultural cooperation and the obligation to develop cultural ties, and the 1995 intergovernmental agreement on the cooperation in the cultural area provides further specifics.

The domain of art, learning, and science (Agreement between the Government, 1995). Free and equitable cultural growth for ex-pat communities; exchanges of delegates; festivals; tours; exhibits; film festivals; exchanges of literature; linkages between libraries; and collaboration between artists, publishers, and cultural foundations were all outlined in this declaration.

2.3 Media in North Korea

North Korea is considered one of the most closed countries in the world from the outside world. However, North Korea is considered one of the most repressive countries. Freedom of expression is almost non-existent, as the media is controlled by the state, and the use of the Internet is limited to government sectors only security.

Although many people see South Korea as a stable democracy, there is mounting evidence that the country's freedom of speech has declined since 2008 and is well behind that of other Asian nations. Freedom of the press in South Korea was downgraded from "free" to "partly free" by Freedom House in 2010, and other foreign assessments have also voiced concerns about the state of freedom of speech there. (Haggard & You, 2015). Abuse of perjury, election campaign regulations, national security constraints on free expression, internet restrictions, and political use of state authority to influence the media are all identified as factors in the decline of South Korea's standing in civil rights rankings. We conclude by examining a

wide range of potential causes, from long-standing cultural variables and the impact of Japanese justice principles to the lasting effects of the Cold War.

You'd be hard-pressed to find a news environment worse than North Korea. The nation stands out for the very tight grip it has over the movement and communication of its inhabitants and tourists, placing it towards the bottom of worldwide free press rankings (Committee to Protect Journalists 2015; Freedom House 2017). However, The Internet penetration rate in South Korea is quite high, and the country has a thriving online culture. Nonetheless, regulatory initiatives like a real name licensing system and increasing enforcement of online activity have posed threats to internet freedom.

According to Statista, Only around 3 percent of North Koreans get their news from domestic TV anyway while the vast majority of people, 71 percent, rely on word of mouth. The second most sought-after news source in the country was foreign radio stations, with 11 percent saying they used them. (see Figure 2).




Figure 2 North Korea media freedom ranking.

Source: <https://www.statista.com/chart/14227/where-north-koreans-get-their-news/>

2.4 Relationship between North Korea and Russia

North Korea has a long history with Russia, and as a result, the country has a large number of Russian speakers among its elder elites. Additionally, the two countries have a common communist past. However, the connection between North Korea and the Soviet Union ended abruptly and in an unpleasant manner in the year 1990. (Snyder, 2019). While Russia maintained a diplomatic presence in Pyongyang, the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the withdrawal of substantial economic subsidies to Pyongyang and a decades-long effort to renegotiate North Korea's outstanding debt to Russia. This occurred even though Russia continued to maintain a diplomatic presence in Pyongyang. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also left Kim with a historical responsibility, in the sense that he wants to steer clear of repeating the mistakes made by the soviets.

2.4 Media in Russia

Russia's neo-authoritarian media system shares more with other non-democratic regimes than it does with the Soviet system that formerly ruled in the same area. (Becker, 2014). Although the current state of media freedom in Russia is dismal, the extent, nature, and systems of control, as well as the role of ideology, are vastly different from those of the Soviet period. Russian President Vladimir Putin is implementing harsh restrictions in the wake of the uprisings in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. He hopes to serve as an example for other authoritarian governments.

Ekho Moskvyy established its broadcast frequency in Moscow and other major Russian cities throughout the 1990s when it also had a period of programming growth and consolidation. The 1990s and Boris Yeltsin's administration, as described by Masha, 2007, were a moment of press freedom because, in Yeltsin's eyes, press freedom was an absolute need. Yeltsin replaced Communism with a bare-bones form of democracy based on only two principles: he despised Communists, and he believed in press freedom.

When it comes to sensitive local matters like Chechnya or big foreign subjects like Georgia or Syria, the Russian media is more diversified than throughout the overwhelming bulk of the Soviet era. While most national dailies and weeklies toe the president's line, readers may buy newspapers with a broad range of perspectives on the streets, at least in large urban areas. (Oates, 2007). The selection is vast, with hundreds of magazines and newspapers to choose from—far more than during the Soviet era—though some of the most widely read are tabloids, which are often regarded as unreliable. *Ekho Moskvyy, although being controlled by the state energy behemoth Gazprom, continues its policy of airing dissenting and even critical voices. It's just the tenth most popular station in the nation, however, thus its influence (and that of other alternative radio voices) is limited. 30 According to the playbook of new authoritarianism, television continues to.

*Ekho Moskvyy is the English transliteration of the radio station's name, which can be translated as "Ekho of Moscow" or "Moscow's Echo." In most non-Russian readings on the station, the transliterated name is used and will be used as such in this paper.

Another noteworthy example where the personalization of power leads to less media freedom in Russia under Putin is. It is even more astonishing to notice how Putin's power grab via personalistic paternalism since he replaced Yeltsin (Hale, 2017) is coupled with a continual slide in Russia's media freedom ranking. (see Figure 3 b).




Figure 3 Russia's media freedom ranking.

Source: The index of media freedom is taken from Solis & Waggoner (2020).

3. Methodology

3.1 Theory of Economic Media

A qualitative method was used for this study. The goal of qualitative research is to comprehend and explain phenomena in light of the significance they have for people and their environments, hence it focuses on studying things in their natural condition (Denzin & Lincoln, 2006, p.3). To describe and comprehend the events experienced by the study participants, qualitative research may be used, as explained by Moleong (2015). As a means of obtaining full data and providing thorough explanations, scholars use interpretive social science (ISS) to shed light on the state of free speech and the press in Russia, North Korea, and Turkmenistan. According to Neuman (2003), the goal of interpretative social science (ISS) is to "systematically execute an analytical technique that is applied to identify the meaning of a social action via direct and thorough observations with scientific style." It is hoped that through using the ISS, researchers will be able to better comprehend and interpret the processes that humans utilize to build and sustain their social environments on Earth (Neuman, 2003 p. 116). This strategy will facilitate the evaluation and identification of issues as they arise in the field, allowing for the discovery of solutions that will allow journalists to conduct investigations and news stories safely and effectively in North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Russia. The scope of press and speech restrictions in the countries of North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Russia is the focus of this research. In-depth interviews, either organized or unstructured, will be one method used to gather data for this study and help researchers reach their goals. The researchers also make an effort to capture or record information and to gather and retrieve documentation in the form of picture content retrieval (Creswell & Poth, 2016). Information on restrictions on speech and media in North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Russia will be collected for this project. To gather texts and other papers to back up the study data, documentation is required.

Supply and demand are the foundation of the economy. In its simplest form, providers develop products and services from limited resources to suit the desires and requirements, or expectations of customers. Suppliers in the media sector include broadcasters, online news outlets, and newspapers and magazines. Actual products and services are seen as excellent content consumed on TV or computers, or via portable devices such as smartphones. Consumers are represented by two primary constituencies: Actual hearings that view, listen or read the material, and advertisers that pay time and space in the media to reach consumers to sell goods and services.

Before describing media finance as the study of how the media sector allocates limited resources to create content that is disseminated to consumers to satisfy diverse preferences, Albarran (2002, p. 5) explains that the media industry is a key player in the global economy. Thus, the term "media economy" refers to the study of the globalization, regulation, technology, and social aspects of media organizations and industries. By using macroeconomic and microeconomic ideas, principles, and theories.

There has been extensive usage of the industrial organization model (also known as the IO model) by academics for some time now to examine the connections between industry structure, firm behavior, and market output. S C P is another name for this model. initially created the IO model, and most of the early literature on media finance used it as a theoretical framework because of its utility for academics and its methodical approach to studying markets. (Albarran et al., 2006).

The development of business theory resulted from research into the market's structure and attempts to refine the IO model. To better explain the most frequent forms of market structure—monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and perfect competition—corporate theory builds on the IO model. Media markets in most industrialized nations are characterized by oligopolistic and monopolistic forms of competition. In the media sector, perfect competition exists only on the web, whereas monopolistic arrangements are often restricted to niche markets like magazines and tv. (Albarran et al., 2006).

4. implication in this theory of Economic Media

According to McFadden, 2019, two observations are used to construct a hypothesis. In the first place, consumers rank media outlets by the value or usefulness they anticipate receiving from them. Secondly, media consumption is one of a few activities that may be done in parallel with scheduled activities without detracting from each other's effectiveness. These new understandings make it possible to formulate a theory that is compatible with findings from cognitive science and other observations of media use.

Technically the word “media” refers to the medium or method for providing informative and entertaining material. In the subject of Economics and elsewhere, studies and debates connected to media tend to be technology and industry-sector-specific. (Alexander et al., 2003). This study abstracts from the platform and business sector perspective and uses “media” to refer to anyway in which textual, audio, or video material. (Anderson et al., 2016). More specifically, "media consumption" describes an individual's usage of certain types of media for either educational or recreational objectives.

However, For applying this theory of Economic Media, in this study we take The Russian-Ukrainian war e.g., for how Economic Media can be affected by the war.

The Russian-Ukrainian war

The crisis's most noticeable immediate effect on the economy has been the significant increase in commodity prices. Russia and Ukraine may only contribute a relatively tiny amount to global commerce and production, but they are major sources of food, energy, and fertilizers—all of which are in jeopardy as a result of the conflict. Already, grain supplies have been stopped at Black Sea ports, which may have devastating effects on food security in developing nations.


The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2022 is likely the most talked-about and consequential event of the year, and it will have far-reaching consequences for the global economy, politics, and many other spheres. (Bowen, 2022). However, e.g., The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2022 is likely the most talked-about and consequential event of the year, and it will have far-reaching consequences for the global economy, politics, and many other spheres.

Figure 4 displays quarterly forecasts of global merchandise trade volume from now through the end of 2023, together with error bars reflecting related confidence ranges. Growth in merchandise trade volume in 2022 might be as low as 0.5 percent or as high as 5.5 percent based on current GDP forecasts. These forecasts will be revised in October, although a change

might be made sooner if new information calls for it. The projection incorporates higher frequency data for specific economies, such as monthly figures on container throughput of U.S. and Chinese ports to account for bottlenecks at those facilities.

Chart 1: Volume of world merchandise trade, 2015Q1-2023Q4

Seasonally-adjusted volume index, 2015=100




Source: WTO and UNCTAD, WTO Secretariat estimates.

Figure 5 below shows the recent, worldwide increase in gasoline costs that began before the situation in Ukraine. March's average price for a barrel of Brent crude oil was US\$ 118, up 38% from January and up 81% year over year. Daily prices have dropped lately, falling from a high of US\$ 128 per barrel on 8 March to US\$ 104 per barrel on 1 April.

Chart 2: Monthly average prices for crude oil and natural gas, January 2018 – March 2022

US\$ per barrel and US\$ per million Btu




Source: World Bank, US Energy Information Administration, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Figure 6 below shows the recent, worldwide increase in gasoline costs that began before the situation in Ukraine. March's average price for a barrel of Brent crude oil was US\$ 118, up 38% from January and up 81% year over year. Daily prices have dropped lately, falling from a high of US\$ 128 per barrel on 8 March to US\$ 104 per barrel on 1 April.

Chart 3: Merchandise exports and imports by region, 2019Q1-2023Q4

Volume index, 2019=100



- a Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.
- b Refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States, including certain associate and former member.

Source: WTO and UNCTAD.

5. Results & Findings

The paper analyses the correlation between power distribution and press freedom under dictatorships using empirical data. We take advantage of the under-researched variance in power-sharing between dictators and their allies to show that it has an impact on media freedom, in contrast to the majority of the current literature which regards authoritarian regimes as a unitary actors. This conclusion advances our knowledge of the authoritarian politics of media freedom in various ways. In the first place, recent research has focused on how authoritarian leaders deliberately utilize the media to gather information about the wrongdoing of local officials and people’s displeasure with the government. To widen this view, we demonstrate how they employ the media to maintain the status quo of power-sharing inside their governing coalition. The media is used by authoritarian elites to provide the public with information that may be used to keep tabs on each other's actions inside the power structure. While it seems to reason that a more personalist dictatorship would be more likely to stifle the press, our finding that media freedom increases as a dictatorship share more authority have received less attention. Second, this work contributes to the body of research on how media coverage may make or break a dictatorship. Our research indicates that unrestricted access to the media may promote their growth and success. Media coverage of the distribution of power might help authoritarian elites avoid misunderstanding and misjudging one another's actions. This means that the emancipation or democratization of a government does not always lead to a loosening of media restrictions. There is no need for a democratic revolution for there to be more freedom of the press.

However, The Turkmen government is not interested in genuine media reform. The government published On the Mass Media with the good intention of improving Turkmenistan's image to the world after the fall of the Soviet Union, but its policy to media policy has not altered and continues to depend heavily on propaganda and repression. As things are, it's hard to see how On the Mass Media can help bring about democracy in Turkmenistan. Following the lead of other post-Soviet nations, where first-generation media regulations helped usher in democracy, we can see that this is achievable, but only with political backing. It is clear from the two Turkmen laws that when media legislation is only a formality, authoritarian governments can nullify and control its effects. Both statutes, although having flaws, improved conditions for journalists by doing things like allowing for more editorial freedom via charter changes. However, the Turkmen dictatorship was able to nullify the positive effects of On Journalism and On Mass Media and impose them at will. To increase its control over the press, the government has manipulated procedures for media registration, the protection of state secrets, and the "freedom of mass information abuse," all while ignoring the provisions for the organization of media, guarantees of editorial independence, and journalistic rights. The Turkmen government will very certainly continue to use On the Mass Media to limit the freedom of the press in a targeted manner. Instead of passing new media legislation, allowing citizens to use the Internet freely may have been the genuine impetus for democracy in a nation where the conventional media are entirely controlled and limited by an authoritarian administration. Due to the potential impact of the new Turkmen law's Internet limitations on this effort, the current formulation of the proposed Turkmen Law on Internet Services warrants careful consideration. This legislation is likely to serve as a model for future media laws in Turkmenistan.

6. Discussion

The idea of strategic narratives as a tool for prospective transference has an impact, among other significant aspects of international relations, on aspects such as diplomacy, negotiation, identity, and the formation of alliances and coalitions. This is because media systems are becoming increasingly global and interconnected. In its most basic form, the malleable and ever-shifting nature of information flow across the international press becomes a singular platform for the construction, validation, and mobilization of truth via story. This is not to say that there is ever necessarily only one truth on just about any given topic or event; rather, what this demonstrates is that the exchange of perspectives across global media makes it possible for various enclaves of thoughts, voices, and opinions to emerge as the truth about regionally specific needs or points of view regarding that topic or event. These enclaves of regionally specific media truths engage in competition and interaction with one another within the framework of the global media system, and they alter whenever new points of view or events take place. Therefore, international media does more than just produce frames; rather, it weaves frames into captivating and cohesive tales by incorporating bigger components of culture, history, principles, and authority. Therefore, legitimacy, facts, perceptions of power, and intentions are less dependent on the objective reality or the validity of an argument and more dependent on carefully crafting media-stated actual policies that show careful orientation between self and even others through the media system that one wishes to penetrate. As a result, having power and the ability to persuade others in international media is inextricably linked to one's capacity to find and understand alignments in narratives, both directly and indirectly.

However, The results suggest that the problem and valence of an event or subject may impact the extent of influence exerted on journalists. Journalists' assessments of the significance

of the rogue state dimension, representing the negative features of North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia, were shown to be significantly influenced by sources operating at the level of social institutions. By contrast, when journalists were asked about their impressions of North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia as conversation partners, which is representative of more impartial characteristics of that country, no significant correlation was found between source credibility and these impressions. Instead, at the level of social institutions, journalists' nationality was the strongest predictor of how seriously they took North Korea's role as a dialogue partner. Journalists are more inclined to cite reputable sources, and the framing and agendas of those sources affect how reporters report the news (Flynn, 2002; McComas & Trumbo, 2001; Powers & Fico, 1994; Reese, 1990). However, the findings of this research suggest that the impact of different sources depends on different characteristics of news stories. This is a noteworthy discovery since earlier research on what influences journalists' news judgments has mostly ignored whether or not good, neutral, or bad elements of events are taken into account. This research provides more concrete evidence of the individual, organizational, social organization, and social system-level influences on journalists by classifying seven characteristics of North Korea as negative and neutral aspects using factor analysis.

7. Conclusion

Additional results from this investigation are also intriguing. There was a considerable association between journalists' political leanings and their views of North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia as both a rogue state and a potential dialogue partner. In general, conservative journalists place more emphasis on the rogue state component and less on the dialogue partner dimension than do their more liberal colleagues. This is consistent with debates taking place in both South Korea and the United States, where conservatives have called for a harder position against North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia while liberals have advocated for more interaction with Pyongyang. In contrast, there was no statistically significant correlation between journalists' job experience and their views on North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia's problems. Even though past research has shown that journalists' work experience might affect their work, such an impact may be issue specific. Regardless matter how long a journalist has covered North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia, they have extremely restricted access to the nation and must rely on official sources for accurate information. Therefore, their coverage of North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia will not have much of an impact on how they value certain aspects of the country. Overall, this study adds to the body of media sociology literature by delving into the myriad of elements at play in the portrayal of North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia's concerns by the media. The study's comparative approach to the multilateral negotiations on North Korea and Turkmenistan, and Russia's nuclear weapons development also contributes to the study of international problems more generally. To give a more generalizable approach to the problems of journalistic perspectives and the relationships between perceptions and reporting methods, future research should analyze news stories from other media sources and other examples of worldwide relevance.

Despite variations in the definition of what the public interest is from country to country, the public and its various groups are responsible for ensuring that the desired outcome—the achievement of the public interest—is realized. This can only happen if journalists and media leaders in the institution have the freedom to respect and apply these principles. The public trusts the media to report on matters of public interest, such as government decisions and budgets approved by parliament that detail spending on services and basic rights, protection of

public freedoms, corruption prevention, perpetrator accountability, and rule of law strengthening.

However, It is not surprising that they arise from the two processes of communication and achieving the goal and influence, as the press seeks to improve the public's right to know and to enable it to determine the position that suits it from among the angles and directions of press coverage while taking care not to cause grave violations that may befall individuals, society, or sources. About these two concerns, there is an immediate need to establish ethical principles and standards that journalists and their institutions undertake to ca for, respect, and apply at the individual and collective level, beginning with the planning and production of media content and the decision to publish it, in a way that helps strengthen trust between the public and the press and what serves the public interest. Religious and cultural values and established norms of societies and nations provide the foundation for these ethical principles and standards, which will continue to impose a remarkable and even tangible value framework on journalism throughout its inevitable historical stages of development around the world.

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