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Divergent Digital Trajectories: A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Disinformation Strategies in Estonia, Hungary, and Romania

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Abstract. Within the current sociotechnical paradigm, the accelerated development of digital technologies has transformed information circulation, making disinformation a transnational phenomenon with significant consequences for democracy, national security, and even for social cohesion. This article investigates the divergent institutional responses to digital disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe, specifically analysing the cases of Estonia, Romania, and Hungary. Using a qualitative-comparative case study design, the research explores the impact of media literacy, institutional trust, and governance models on societal resilience. The findings indicate that collaborative "whole-of-society" models (Estonia) are significantly more effective than authoritarian (Hungary) or fragmented (Romania) approaches. The study highlights how the lack of coherent strategy and low institutional trust creates vulnerabilities that are exploited not only by external actors but, in some cases, by domestic political entities.

Keywords. disinformation, public policy, media literacy, digital governance, institutional trust

1. Introduction: The systemic threat of information disorder

Global interconnectivity has radically altered how we consume and weaponize information. No longer just a tool for learning, information has become a lever of power, with disinformation acting as a subtle yet potent form of social control. This shift poses a danger that extends far beyond communication; it is a systemic risk to social cohesion and democratic integrity. Recognizing this volatility, bodies like the United Nations and the European Commission have flagged coordinated disinformation as a primary security threat, especially during high-stakes elections or times of instability.

Events like the Brexit referendum and successive US elections have proven how easily digital platforms can be leveraged to distort reality. In Central and Eastern Europe, this threat is particularly acute. A legacy of exposure to external propaganda, combined with the ongoing war in Ukraine, has made the region a testing ground for manipulative content. This leaves governments facing a difficult paradox: they must act to curb disinformation, yet doing so risks stifling legitimate debate and compromising the very trust they seek to protect.

This article addresses this question by comparing three distinct institutional responses within the European Union: Estonia, Romania, and Hungary. Despite sharing a regional history

of post-communist transition, these nations have adopted radically different strategies: ranging from Estonia's high-tech, collaborative democracy to Hungary's centralized control and Romania's fragmented, low-trust environment.

The present paper identifies a significant gap in the study of the efficacy of governmental responses to the phenomenon of disinformation, despite the increasingly ample recognition of the state's essential role in defending the integrity of the information space. At the European level, notable progress has been recorded through initiatives such as the Action Plan against Disinformation (2018) and the establishment of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), which provide a framework for action and support for member states. policies are formulated.

However, at the national level, there is considerable variation in policy efficiency, which is heavily influenced by political context, administrative capacity, and institutional maturity. For example, in Romania, the absence of a unitary and coherent strategy to combat disinformation is evident; although punctual initiatives exist regarding public health or national security, inter-institutional cooperation remains often deficient. This lack of strategic cohesion constitutes a major vulnerability against the propagation of manipulative content, highlighting the necessity for a more integrated national approach. Furthermore, a critical challenge lies in maintaining the delicate balance between state intervention and freedom of expression. To ensure that regulatory measures are not perceived or utilized as tools for excessive control over public discourse, any public policy must be transparent, proportional, and strictly grounded in democratic principles to protect citizens' fundamental rights.

Consequently, I aim to provide an academic contribution that addresses the knowledge gap created by the rapid evolution of disinformation and the mechanisms through which it operates within the digital landscape. As (Kearney, 2017) notes, when the knowledge void is substantial and solutions are either little-known or difficult to implement, even preliminary progress, such as exploratory descriptive studies or well-executed pilot projects, can yield valuable contributions by offering insights into potential possibilities for a field that remains unresolved.

2. Theoretical Framework: Literature Review

To formulate effective public policy, it is important to delineate the conceptual boundaries of the threat. The literature emphasizes a rigorous distinction between misinformation, disinformation, and fake news, as recent scholarship suggests that maintaining these conceptual distinctions is recommended for effective analysis.

Misinformation vs. Disinformation: the intent to harm

Misinformation refers to incorrect or misleading information shared without malicious intent, often arising from error or misunderstanding. While typically lacking the intent to harm, its impact can be significant, generating confusion during crises. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the rapid circulation of misinformation regarding health measures contributed to the erosion of trust in health authorities and led to counterproductive social behaviours. Scholars note that misinformation often spreads through informal channels like urban legends or rumours, driven by emotional appeals rather than facts (Ovsianko et al., 2024).

Disinformation, conversely, constitutes a deliberate attack on the integrity of knowledge. It is defined as the intentional dissemination of false or distorted information to mislead the public for political, economic, or strategic gain (Tyshchenko & Muzhanova, 2022). It acts as an instrument of influence, often utilized in hybrid warfare to model perceptions and

erode trust in legitimate sources. When false information circulates and is accepted as true, the informational environment becomes "polluted", compromising the ability of individuals to distinguish truth from falsehood and undermining the democratic process (Tsipursky, 2017).

The anatomy of "fake news"

The term "Fake News", designated the word of the year in 2017 by Collins Dictionary, describes fabricated information that mimics the form of news media but lacks its organizational process or intent. Typically, these news stories do not rely on verifiable facts, credible sources, or authentic materials, but instead resort to exploiting prejudices, stereotypes, and collective emotions, to the detriment of rational and verifiable arguments (Akgül, 2019). Also, (Alcott & Gentzkow, 2017) define fake news as "news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers". To understand this phenomenon in depth, (Figueira & Oliveira, 2017) argue that one must analyse three essential factors: the nature of the content, the credibility of the source, and the mechanisms of dissemination.

The production of such content is typically associated with actors operating for political or economic benefit. Authors (Vosoughi et al., 2018) highlight that the diffusion of fake news is often politically motivated. Furthermore, (Obadă & Fârte, 2024) conceptualize the shaping of public opinion through fake news as an instance of social control that influences individual opinions and behaviours.

A critical structural advantage of fake news in the digital age is its viral potential.

While traditional media like TV, radio, and newspapers have long dominated the formation of public opinion and voter behaviour (Bennett & Entman, 2001) (Denemark, 2002) (Gerber et al., 2009), the emergence of social networking sites has injected novel dynamics into the political ecosystem. By facilitating near-instantaneous dissemination and community formation, platforms like Facebook and Twitter have revolutionized the interface between citizens and political discourse (Bakshy et al., 2015) (Bright, 2016). Also, these platforms algorithmically curate content feeds by analysing historical behaviour and engagement metrics. This process fosters 'filter bubbles' that systematically insulate users from counter-attitudinal information (Pariser, 2011) (Kitchens et al., 2020).

Other contributions (Tandoc et al., 2020) emphasize that fake news often travels faster and wider than verified facts because algorithms privilege content that elicits high emotional arousal, such as fear or outrage. This creates a significant challenge for democratic deliberation, as highlighted by a vast body of international literature (Gerber et al., 2009) (Chiang & Knight, 2011) (Drago et al., 2014) (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007) (Rossignoli, 2022) (Akgül, 2019), which confirms the negative impact of fake news on voting behaviour and trust in institutions. Fabricated or false information, commonly referred to as "fake news" is presented under the guise of authenticity with the primary objective of manipulating public opinion (Dzamukashvili, 2023).

Typologies of falsehood in the "post-truth" era

The proliferation of fake news must be understood within the context of a "post-truth" world. The collapse of traditional knowledge hierarchies, such as mass media and education, has created a vacuum filled by a "culture of risks" where fear and uncertainty are exploited (Bayer et al., 2019).

To better categorize these threats, researchers (Fârte & Obadă, 2018) have identified specific forms of fake news, including:

Clickbait: Articles with misleading titles designed to generate traffic and ad revenue, characterized by uncertain factual content;

Satire/Parody: Humorous content without explicit intent to deceive, though it may confuse audiences if the context is lost;

Imposter content: Genuine sources are impersonated to lend false credibility to fabricated stories;

Fabricated content: New content is 100% false, designed to deceive and do harm;

Manipulated content: Genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive (e.g., doctored photos);

False context: Genuine content is shared with false contextual information (e.g., old photos attributed to a new event);

Misleading content: The tendentious use of information to frame an issue in a specific way to manipulate perception.

It is also important to note that susceptibility to these forms varies. In their article, (Hassan et al., 2020) found that certain demographic groups, such as the elderly or religious fundamentalists, may be more prone to believing false information. Finally, contrary to the belief that disinformation is solely the domain of rogue actors, (Miró-Llinares & Aguerri, 2023) emphasize that governments themselves can be sources of fake news. Consequently, there is an urgent need for government intervention and regulation, as argued by (Vese, 2022) and (Leiser, 2017), to protect the functioning of democratic processes.

3. Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative-comparative case study design to analyse public policies in Estonia, Romania, and Hungary. This methodological choice allows for an in-depth investigation of the institutional, normative, and discursive contexts in which anti-disinformation.

The rationale for this methodological choice stems from the specific nature of the object of study: disinformation is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, ranging from information security to democratic regulation, and the policies targeting it involve a variety of actors, interests, and normative frameworks. I consider that at this stage of research a quantitative analysis would not suit my objectives to capture these institutional and discursive dimensions, whereas a comparative approach offers the opportunity to identify patterns, rankings, best practices, and factors of success or failure in managing this challenge.

The interpretation of the results is grounded in the specific historical and socio-political dynamics of the analysed periods (Chelcea, 2001), ensuring a nuanced understanding that supports both detailed case evaluation and the broader generalization of intervention typologies.

The selection of Estonia, Romania, and Hungary leverages their shared post-communist background to analyse divergent institutional responses to digital disinformation. While Estonia actively integrates AI into education through initiatives like "AI Leap" (Financial Times, 2025), Romania lacks a cohesive strategy, and Hungary's digital policies (Digital Skills&Jobs Platform, 2025) are often politically compromised. Geopolitically, these nations face common hybrid threats but exhibit different levels of resilience. For instance, (Kremez, 2023) highlights the critical media engagement of Estonia's Russian-speaking population, whereas Romania's vulnerability was underscored by the cancellation of the 2024 presidential election runoff due to foreign interference (BBC, 2024).

This comparison is further deepened by disparities in democratic quality. Estonia maintains a transparent media environment (Reporters without borders, 2025), in contrast to

Romania, which has regressed to a "hybrid regime" (Our World in Data, 2025), and Hungary, where press freedom has significantly declined (Reporters without borders, 2025) amidst state media capture (Financial Times) during the *Orbán era*. Consequently, analysing these distinct contexts using accessible official data offers critical insights for harmonizing European information security policies.

* The analysis was conducted while the Fidesz party was governing Hungary.

The analysis relies on primary sources, including national strategies, legislation, and government action plans, as well as secondary sources such as reports from the OECD, Eurostat, and specialized NGOs like GLOBSEC and EDMO. I also use press materials and investigations. Content analysis was employed to identify dominant policy narratives and governance models.

4. Comparative analysis: drivers of resilience

Drawing from a synthesis of recent scholarly contributions, this study interrogates three central hypotheses concerning the efficacy of anti-disinformation policies.

The educational divide: media literacy and resilience

H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of media literacy and the population's resistance to disinformation (Bimber, 2003).

Media literacy is defined as a critical mechanism for enhancing social resilience against disinformation, equipping citizens with the necessary skills to analyse and evaluate complex information flows (Hobbs, 2019) (Capello, 2017). We can define social resilience as the capacity to withstand and transform under pressure, which integrates individual actions, community bonds, and structural frameworks into a cohesive response system aimed at preserving public well-being. Social resilience emerges from interdisciplinary social science perspectives, emphasizing not just survival in the face of challenges like economic inequality, disasters, or social disruptions, but proactive adaptation and evolution. At its foundation, it involves identifying key characteristics such as resource access, social networks, and adaptive behaviours that enable groups to buffer against stressors (Moya & Goenechea, 2022). Research shows that informed media consumption fosters stronger social networks and adaptive cognitions, countering isolation and promoting prosocial behaviors that bolster group-level endurance (Fraser & Pakenham, 2009) (Rüther et al., 2023).

This capacity for critical engagement is essential for deciphering the consensus-manufacturing processes of modern media (Macedo & Steinberg, 2007). In the Eastern European context, (Boshnakova & Dănkovă, 2023) distinguish between the "Nordic-style" systems of the Baltic states, characterized by high press freedom, and the high political parallelism found in Romania and Hungary. This divergence is evident in policy implementation: Estonia is cited as a best practice model, having integrated mandatory media education and institutional resources (Rara, 2023), a strategy validated by its 4th place ranking in the Media Literacy Index (Open Society Institute, 2023).

In contrast, Romania and Hungary lack systemic public policies for media literacy. Romania (ranked 34th in the same ranking system) relies on sporadic NGO-led pilot programs rather than a cohesive national curriculum, while Hungary (ranked 27th) faces challenges related to media concentration and a lack of civic ecosystem support, increasing vulnerability to hostile narratives (Urbán et al., 2023). The hypothesis linking literacy to resilience could also be empirically supported by public health data: while Estonia and Hungary achieved COVID-19 vaccination rates of 64.46% and 66.3% respectively, Romania recorded a significantly lower

rate of 28.56% (Our World in Data, 2024), highlighting the real-world impact of exposure to unchecked disinformation.

The hypothesis postulating a positive relationship between media literacy levels and population resistance to disinformation is supported by the analysed data. Estonia, characterized by the systemic inclusion of media education, demonstrates a significantly superior capacity to detect and reject manipulative content. In contrast, Romania lacks a coherent national strategy, rendering its initiatives too isolated to achieve mass impact, while Hungary faces a dual deficit defined by the absence of educational policy and a controlled media climate that diminishes critical capacity.

Consequently, while systemic media education emerges as a key factor for democratic resilience, (Jaakkola, 2020) argues that it cannot function as an independent solution for broader societal issues like democratic erosion, necessitating a more nuanced and multi-factorial analysis of the phenomenon.

These findings lend empirical weight to the posited relationship between media literacy and resilience, suggesting that the "Nordic-style" investment in critical thinking yields measurable public health and security dividends. Yet, the data also reveals the limits of treating education as a silver bullet. While the absence of systemic policy leaves countries like Romania distinctly vulnerable to hostile narratives, the presence of media literacy alone cannot fully offset the pressures of media concentration or political polarization. Consequently, while the hypothesis holds, it points to a broader reality: media literacy is a necessary condition for information security, but it is likely insufficient without a supportive civic and political ecosystem.

The trust factor: institutions as anchors of truth

H2: Trust in state institutions influences the efficiency of anti-disinformation policy implementation.

The hypothesis positing that institutional trust is a fundamental prerequisite for the receptivity and effectiveness of anti-disinformation policies is strongly supported by the comparative data. This premise suggests that government interventions, regardless of their technical sophistication, cannot achieve desired outcomes in the absence of sufficient institutional capital to foster citizen compliance with official norms.

Estonia exemplifies a positive correlation between high institutional confidence and the effective implementation of anti-disinformation strategies. According to (OECD, 2024), trust in the national government stood at 38% in 2023, aligning with the OECD average. However, specific institutions enjoy significantly higher confidence: the police (74%) and the judicial system (62%) both surpass OECD averages. Notably, 52% of Estonians report high trust in the public service (OECD, 2023). Atypical of general trends, Estonian women (39%) exhibit higher trust in government than men (37%), although significant disparities exist based on citizens' perceived ability to influence policy.

This robust social capital has allowed the state to implement proactive measures, such as the Ministry of Culture's allocation of over \$2.8 million in 2022 to support independent Russian-language media, thereby providing credible alternatives to Kremlin propaganda. Theoretical support for this dynamic is found in (Kuokštis, 2015), who notes that Estonia's institutional trust facilitated superior fiscal resilience compared to Lithuania during economic crises, suggesting that trust acts as a buffer that reduces vulnerability to destabilizing narratives.

In contrast, **Romania** faces a chronic trust deficit that severely impedes state intervention. Current data indicates that only 17.4% of citizens trust Parliament and 19.4% trust the Government, while trust in the media stands at a mere 27% (Reuters Institute Digital News

Report, 2024). Hameleers (2022) demonstrates through experimental data that such deep-seated mistrust leads citizens to reject credible information and find disinformation more persuasive. This scepticism is rooted in the perception of politics as a domain of corruption and manipulation (Țăranu & Țăranu, 2013).

The alienation between the state and citizens was exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although satisfaction initially rose, it plummeted to 37.20% by October 2020 as the government employed coercive measures, including the mobilization of military forces to enforce lockdowns (Radu, 2021). This authoritarian approach, combined with the mismanagement of public resources typified by the purchase of expiring vaccines (Lobby Romania, 2023), has cemented a perception of the state as incompetent and coercive, rendering anti-disinformation campaigns suspect in the eyes of the public.

Hungary presented a complex case where declining trust converges with democratic erosion. (GLOBSEC, 2024) reported in the last years that satisfaction with democracy has fallen to 36%, and trust in the government has dropped to 39%. A critical anomaly is observed in media consumption: only 34% trust conventional media, yet in the Hungarian context, "trusting mainstream media" often correlates with consuming pro-government narratives that are hostile to EU and NATO values.

The former government used this polarized environment to weaponize anti-disinformation rhetoric. This was evident in the Sovereignty Protection Office's investigation into Transparency International, a move criticized by the US and the EU as an intimidation tactic disguised as national security (Free Europe Romania, 2024). Furthermore, the financial asymmetry in the information space is stark. (European Digital Media Conservatory, 2024) reveals that the former ruling party, Fidesz, spent €5.4 million on digital political advertising prior to the 2024 elections, compared to just €1.4 million by the opposition. This imbalance, combined with the politicization of regulatory bodies, confirms that without genuine institutional trust and neutrality, state-led anti-disinformation policies are perceived merely as instruments of political control.

The hypothesis is confirmed. The efficiency of anti-disinformation policies is contingent upon the level of institutional trust. Estonia demonstrates that high trust facilitates the acceptance of preventive measures, whereas the systemic mistrust in Romania and the polarized state capture in Hungary lead to the rejection or weaponization of such policies. Therefore, effective strategies must be built upon a foundation of credible, transparent governance.

Governance models: collaborative vs. authoritarian vs. fragmented

H3: Collaborative models (government-civil society-platforms) are more efficient than authoritarian ones (Donovan, 2021).

The central hypothesis posits that effective anti-disinformation strategies require functional partnerships between the state, civil society, academia, and technological platforms. Research by (Paar-Jakli, 2024) (Kollár, 2022), and (Durach et al., 2020) suggests that collaborative approaches are significantly more adaptable and trusted than coercive, state-centric measures. This view is supported by (Starbird et al., 2019), who define disinformation as a collaborative crowd activity, necessitating an equally collaborative response like the "digital elf" initiatives seen in the Baltic region (Markovitz, 2023).

Estonia serves as the empirical validation of this hypothesis. Its strategy is anchored in a fully digitized society where 100% of public services are online (E-Stonia), supported by high digital literacy evidenced by PISA results where Estonian students rank first in Europe for mathematics and creative thinking (The Guardian, 2025).

The Estonian model transcends mere digitalization through deep inter-sectoral cooperation. Initiatives like Propastop.org, a civic-military platform run by Defence League volunteers, and Debunk.eu, which integrates automation with human fact-checking, illustrate how civil society acts as a force multiplier for national security. Furthermore, the "AI Leap 2025" program (Ministry of Education and Research, 2025) demonstrates a proactive educational approach, integrating OpenAI tools directly into the curriculum. This transparency fosters resilience, creating a society where the state acts as a facilitator rather than a censor.

In stark contrast, **Romania** exhibits a "bifurcated reality" where the state publicly commits to fighting disinformation while covertly participating in it. Despite the adoption of a Memorandum aligned with the Digital Services Act (Hot News, 2024), the implementation is undermined by severe institutional distrust and low digital literacy, with the country ranking last in the DESI 2022 index (European Commission, 2022).

More alarmingly, investigations reveal active state complicity in disinformation. While the Minister of Digitalization denied the use of bot farms, (Public Record, 2024) identified networks of fake accounts promoting the ruling party at that time, PSD. Similarly, (Snoop.ro, 2024) exposed that the Liberal Party (PNL), a traditional party as well, indirectly financed the TikTok campaign of the extremist contender Călin Georgescu via the firm Kensington, manipulating algorithmic distribution under the guise of independent content.

Further investigations by (Context.ro, 2024) into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' procurement of an AI-based surveillance tool for monitoring journalists raise concerns about the weaponization of anti-disinformation rhetoric for privacy infringement. Consequently, Romania suffers from the highest susceptibility to fake news in the region, with 37% of the population trusting manipulative content (GLOBSEC, 2017). The state's duality, acting as both a regulator and a source of manipulation, validates the hypothesis that without genuine collaboration and transparency, policy interventions fail.

Hungary represents the negative pole of the spectrum, where the "anti-disinformation" framework was used to consolidate state capture. With Fidesz controlling approximately 90% of the media landscape (Applebaum, 2021), the state did not combat disinformation but monopolized it. Hunter (2024) and (Sato & Wiebrecht, 2024) note that authoritarian regimes are statistically more likely to export disinformation, a trend visible in Hungary's synchronization with Kremlin narratives (RISE project, 2023).

Media credibility served as a foundational pillar for democratic stability, as it underpins an informed citizenry and bolsters confidence in governance structures (Ardèvol-Abreu & Gil de Zúñiga, 2017). When confidence in the media wanes, the consequences transcend individual news outlets, ultimately eroding societal faith in public institutions and democratic processes (Suiter & Fletcher, 2020). High perceived media credibility instils greater confidence in the veracity of consumed information (Kioussis, 2001; Mourão et al., 2018). Furthermore, this confidence incentivizes users to engage with heterogeneous viewpoints, thereby insulating them against the polarizing effects of digital echo chambers (Jamieson & Capella, 2008) (Sunstein, 2009) (Chang et al., 2023).

In Hungary, politicization of the information space was total. The Sovereignty Protection Office's investigation into Transparency International constitutes a direct attack on civil society, prompting the EU to freeze funds due to Rule of Law violations (Politico, 2025). The collaboration between the Hungarian government and platforms like X (formerly Twitter), driven by ideological alignment between Elon Musk and Viktor Orbán (Hungary Daily News, 2023), further insulated the population in an "informational autocracy".

The hypothesis is unequivocally confirmed. The Estonian model demonstrates that collaborative, inclusive architectures generate societal resilience. Conversely, the Hungarian model showed that authoritarian control destroys public trust and created a "post-truth" environment. Romania occupies a precarious middle ground, where the potential of civil society is negated by a political class that views disinformation not as a threat to be neutralized, but as a tool to be exploited.

5. Conclusions and discussion

The comparative analysis of institutional responses in Romania, Estonia, and Hungary highlights the complexity of the phenomenon and validates the necessity for multidimensional approaches. Primarily, the study substantiates a robust positive correlation between the systematic integration of media education and societal resilience against disinformation. The Estonian case demonstrates that consistent investment in literacy programs enhances citizens' discernment, whereas the low literacy levels in Romania constitute a primary determinant of its population's vulnerability.

Furthermore, a direct correlation is observed between public trust in state institutions and the efficacy of anti-disinformation policies. In low-trust environments like Romania and former Fidesz ruled Hungary, government initiatives frequently encounter strong resistance, sometimes passivity, or even scepticism, effectively diminishing their impact. This erosion of confidence in fundamental institutions creates a feedback loop where mistrust perpetuates vulnerability to informational manipulation.

Regarding governance frameworks, the investigation validates the superiority of collaborative, participatory models that bridge government, civil society, NGOs, opinion leaders and digital platforms. These multi-stakeholder approaches are proven to be more legitimate and sustainable than authoritarian interventions. Measures imposed exclusively by the state risk being perceived as instruments of informational control, thereby validating inter-sectoral cooperation as the most viable alternative. Consequently, policies prioritizing digital education and critical thinking foster an intrinsic capacity to evaluate content, mitigating risks of polarization.

Ultimately, disinformation is identified not merely as a security issue but as a direct threat to social cohesion. This is particularly acute in polarized contexts such as Romania nowadays, where we can observe manipulative narratives that exacerbate existing divisions and undermine the structural stability of public dialogue.

6. Limitations and future research directions

While this study provides a nuanced qualitative analysis of institutional responses to disinformation, several methodological limitations must be acknowledged regarding the generalizability of its findings.

The qualitative nature of the research, restricted to three specific case studies, precludes statistical extrapolation to the broader population or different national contexts without further adaptation. Furthermore, the volatility of the contemporary information environment, driven by rapid technological shifts and evolving disinformation strategies, limits the long-term predictability of these conclusions, necessitating continuous monitoring. Assessing the direct efficacy of public policies remains inherently complex due to the multidimensional variables involved, ranging from technological factors to socio-cultural dynamics, which complicates the isolation of specific intervention effects.

Consequently, I strongly recommend future research to prioritize large-scale quantitative studies on representative samples to statistically validate these correlations and establish a robust empirical basis for policy development.

Longitudinal research is essential to evaluate the sustained impact of media literacy programs and collaborative policies on societal resilience. Additionally, investigations should address the dual role of artificial intelligence in both generating and detecting disinformation, requiring an interdisciplinary approach to anticipate future policy configurations.

Finally, expanding the comparative framework to include a broader spectrum of governance models and information cultures would facilitate a more comprehensive global understanding of the phenomenon and the identification of transferable best practices.

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